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This  paper uses  a  business model  framework to analyze  the  main limitations  of Apple  Inc.
post-2003,  a significant  turning  point  in the  company’s  history.  As such,  we  move  beyond
an  exclusive focus on what  makes Apple  unique  or  different by  evaluating  the  mundane
and  out-dated  elements of its  business model.  To do  so, we  examine the  end-to-end  supply
chain,  from source to  store,  to present a more holistic  evaluation  of the  Apple  business
model.  Drawing  on the  existing  literature, we  argue  that  the  quintessential element  of
the  Apple  business model  is its  ability to ‘own the  consumer’.  In  short,  the  Apple  business
model  is  designed  to  drive consumers  into its ecosystem and then hold them  there, which
has  been  hugely successful to  date  and  has  allowed  Apple  to wield  enormous  power  in the
end-to-end  supply chain.  We demonstrate this through  a  detailed evaluation  of Apple’s
physical  and content  supply chains  and its  retailing  strategy.  Moreover,  we find  that  the
very  business  processes  that enable  unparalleled  corporate  control bring with  them  new
problems  that Apple has  thus  far  been  unable, or  unwilling,  to adequately  address.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. 
1. Introduction
The Apple business model affects not only its direct shareholders but also moves markets, which impacts overall macro-
economic performance. In  April 2012, Apple’s shares reached a  high of $636.00 and market capitalization surged to $570
billion, more than the value of Google, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, Dell and Yahoo combined (Russolillo, 2012). At the time,
Apple Inc. comprised four percent of the Standard and Poor’s 500 stock index and almost 18 percent of the Nasdaq 100
(Levisohn, 2012), making it able to singlehandedly sway market indices, affecting index-linked mutual or pension funds and
all those people dependent on them. Current explanations of Apple’s stunning performance and success tend to  focus on
innovation in product design or marketing strategy. An  emphasis on  innovation does not devote adequate attention to  the
tangible limits to growth of this particular business model. One example is the imperative to continually create new and
revolutionary products to  sustain its current profitability and expand at an above average market rate.
The  objective of this paper is to analyze the post-2003 Apple business model to  highlight the weaknesses created by its
perceived strengths. This requires us to move beyond an exclusive focus on what makes Apple unique or  different when
evaluating their business model and include the mundane and out-dated elements of its processes that may  be undermining
its ability to compete and grow in  a changing market. To do so, we examine the end-to-end supply chain, from source to
store, to present a more holistic evaluation of the Apple business model. First, we  begin by isolating the post-2003 business
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model from the many iterations of Apple Inc. since its creation in  1978, which links directly to key conceptualizations of
Apple within the business model literature. From here, we explore the space created to more closely consider the limits to
growth engendered by  this particular business model.
Second, we argue that  the quintessential element of the Apple business model is its ability to  ‘own the consumer’. In short,
the Apple business model is  designed to  drive consumers into its ecosystem and then hold them there, which has been hugely
successful to date and allowed Apple to  wield enormous power in the end-to-end supply chain. This  business model gives
Apple the unique ability to maintain a  low cost sourcing strategy while maintaining high price points and subsequently
locking the consumer in through high switching penalties. We argue that  a key facet of the Apple business model is  ensuring
that Apple content can only be played on Apple devices, as this helps maintain digital download market share and in  turn
drives sales volume for profitable hardware devices. Apple maintains this multi-channel platform integration through legal
and technological means and extends its mantra of control past the multi-platform to all partners in  the supply chain,
including suppliers and manufacturers.
Third, we show that the power Apple derives from owning the consumer is  evident downstream in the supply chain, e.g.,
with retailers, as Apple designs its own in-store displays and places their own  sales staff in  big box retail stores to promote
Apple products. Access to  the lucrative Apple consumer is  a  prize big box retailers cannot resist, even though it places them
at a disadvantage because of direct competition from Apple stores and a  consistent loss of content to Apple’s online store.
Finally, we consider how the very business processes that enable unparalleled corporate control over its end-to-end
supply  chain bring with them new problems that Apple has thus far been unable, or unwilling, to address. For instance,
Apple clings to an outdated efficiency-based supply chain design, putting it in  the firing line of human rights groups, which
will only serve to undermine its brand image in the long term. Moreover, Apple has yet to  adopt a  sophisticated category
management scheme that would allow for a more strategic use of the retail landscape. These limitations are made clear by
Apple’s on-going difficulties competing with emerging rival ecosystems (Android, Symbian) and devices (smartphones and
tablets). We  conclude by  considering how the study of business models allows for a richer evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of corporate strategic management practices. Moreover, we consider how more detailed research into Apple
can help us understand how market leaders are created and, inevitably, decline.
2. When the ‘novelty’ wears off
There are many different explanations for Apple’s recent success. Some regale the ‘return’ of Steve Jobs as the decisive
factor  leading Apple out of the technology wilderness (Harvey & Novicevic, 2006; Strategic Direction, 2008; Swallow, 2011).
Others focus on innovation, be it marketing and product design, software and content delivery, or good timing and a hint
of serendipity (Dedrick, Kraemer, & Linden, 2009; Reder, 2009; Zott & Amit, 2010). Finally, there are those that  point to
Apple’s ability to extract extraordinary margins due to  a low cost manufacturing strategy and an ability to maintain high
price points by providing a  ‘unique’ retail experience (Duhigg & Bradsher, 2012; Froud et al., 2012; Sorescu, Frambach, Singh,
Rangaswamyd, & Bridges, 2011; Useem, 2012). While each observation has merit, they tend to  highlight only one element of
Apple’s business to  explain the entirety of its current success. Here, we  use a  business model framework to analyze how these
different practices combine to create a  recognizable Apple business model. The strength of the business model approach is
that it frames a  system of interdependent activities that  transcends the focal firm and spans its boundaries, breaking down
the ‘inside-outside’ distinction when evaluating what constitutes firm activities (Amit & Zott, 2001; Zott & Amit, 2010). The
boundary-spanning nature of business models emphasizes activities performed for the focal firm but outside its boundaries
by partners, suppliers or customers; for instance, even when key activities, such as product development or manufacturing,
are shifted outside the firm, they remain a  central part of the business model (Chesbrough, 2006).
Specifically, we  analyze the post-2003 Apple business model. Apple has undergone several corporate iterations since
its founding in 1978: at the outset, Apple’s business model allowed outside companies, such as software and component
providers, to use and enhance the base model. In  1978, the Apple II personal computer had an open architecture platform,
allowing several new companies to produce specialized hardware and software components to rival the vertically integrated
giants IBM, Burroughs and Digital Equipment (Hagel & Singer, 2000). In 1997, Apple devised a more collaborative approach
to PC making by fitting Macs with Intel processors and allowing users to run both Mac  and Windows operating systems
(Strategic Direction, 2008). However, we argue that 2003 marks a decisive turning point in the business model through the
integration of two new technological platforms, the iPod and the iTunes Music store (iTMS). By controlling the interface
between its hardware and content, Apple was able to gain complete control of the multi-channel platform and realize the
first opportunity to  truly ‘own the consumer’.
Fig. 1 illustrates the significance of 2003 as a turning point: by the end of 1997, Apple’s stock price was $3.23. Apple’s
shares  did make some significant gains over the next two years due to the dot-com boom and market excitement over Jobs’
return, rising to $29.00 by  the end of 1999. However, contrary to  enthusiasts who  herald the return of Steve Jobs as the firm’s
turning point, Fig. 1 shows how shares actually plummeted to $7.00 by the end of 2000 as the dot-com bubble burst, a full
three years after Mr.  Jobs’ return. Others see the 2001 launch of the iPod music player as the catalyst for Apple’s current
success, but a year after its launch, just 125,000 devices had been sold and Apples share price stagnated between $7.00 and
$11.00 until 2003 (Lloyd, 2012). It was not until 2003, when Apple launched its third-generation iPod in  conjunction with
the iTunes Music Store (iTMS), that Apple’s share price began its dramatic ascent.
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Fig. 1. Apple’s share price from  1996 to 2012 (USD).
From 2003 onward, Apple’s exceptional performance derives from controlling the multi-channel platform. Apple hard-
ware can be purchased (at similar price points) in  a multitude of retail channels including online, at big-box retailers and in
Apple’s own retail stores; however, the content for these devices can only be found in  one place—the official Apple online
store. This multi-channel platform integration was  then replicated with the iPhone and iPad devices. Admittedly, prior to
2003 Apple Computer did  integrate its in-house operating system with software to allow the company to save  on licensing
costs and retain a higher share of profits. This was in contrast to other desktop and laptop manufacturers who  had to pay
licensing fees to  Microsoft, thereby reducing their revenue share. However, it was  the advent of the iPod and iTMS that
consolidated the practice of hardware and software integration into a  substantial revenue generator for Apple. Harvey and
Novicevic (Harvey & Novicevic, 2006) call it a ‘disruptive technology’ because it created a  new platform that encouraged
the interests of studios (SONY, BMG, EMI) and consumers to  converge for the first time. Dedrick et al. (2009) emphasize
how Apple maintained control over key elements of the iPod, particularly the user interface, and the interfaces between the
iPod, iTunes software, and the online iTunes Store. It was  through this strategy that Apple was  able to  capture by far the
largest share of profits from its innovation in the iPod. More importantly, Apple was able to protect its integrated platform
by refusing to open up the digital rights management (DRM) system, thereby enabling it to  protect corporate knowledge on
industrial design and user interfaces.
Zott and Amit (2010) use the concept of design themes to evaluate the character of different types of business models.
They classify Apple as a  novelty-centered design because the development of the iPod/iTunes platform expanded the locus
of its innovation from the product to  its business model: Apple was  the first consumer electronics company to  include music
distribution as an activity (content novelty), linking it to  the development of the iPod hardware and software (structure
novelty), and digitizing it,  thereby pushing many sub-activities in the form of legal music downloads to its customers
(governance  novelty). In this case, the business model itself is  a  source of competitive advantage that is  distinct from the
firm’s product market position (Christensen, 2001; Zott & Amit, 2008). However, this particular characterization of the Apple
business model emphasizes the unique at the expense of the mundane. More problematic, singling out the ‘novel’ does not
adequately consider the full array of business processes that make the multi-platform model work, which undermines the
very strength of the business model framework. We  address this point by awarding greater consideration to the weaknesses
of the novelty-centered design more generally and the Apple business model more specifically.
The meteoric rise and return to earth of a  novel business model is  predictable, as novelty alone is insufficient to ensure a
sustainable competitive advantage, especially when it is not  properly adapted to  the competitive environment (Teece, 2010).
We can simply assume the predictable decline of market makers will eventual befall Apple; for instance, other technology
giants such as Microsoft in 1999 and Cisco in 2000, enjoyed similarly dominant positions only to steadily decline back to
normal rates of growth and performance. More interesting is  the specific limitations of the Apple business model itself, in
which the very source of its current success will eventually undermine its ability to grow and out-perform its competitors.
3. Owning the consumer
The  source of Apple’s recent success is a  business model that enables the firm to exercise unparalleled control over its
multi-channel platform. This business model relies on the integration of content (software, media, and apps) and hardware
(laptops, phones, and tablets) to drive growth. According to Reder (2009), Apple software may  or may  not be profitable, but
hardware is profitable (p. 199). Therefore, a  lack of interoperability is pivotal to Apple’s business model, as it helps maintain
digital download market share and delivers high margins by driving sales volume for hardware devices. Apple maintains this
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multi-channel platform integration through contract and intellectual property laws along with technological measures as
a strategy to govern users’ actions regarding the purchase and use of content (Reder, 2009). Controlling the multi-platform
allows  Apple to dictate terms to both suppliers and customers. Apple dominates the retail landscape by acting as both a
primary supplier of hardware to retailers and a  major competitor through its own  retail stores. Apple then ensures that
consumers are “locked-in” to the multi-channel platform by imposing high switching costs, as Apple content can only be
played on Apple hardware.
This  business model allows Apple to  ‘own the consumer,’ which gives it unparalleled power over its end-to-end sup-
ply chain. The integrated platform is  crucial because it inscribes profitability into each hardware unit. Specifically, Apple’s
physical supply chain or the manufacture and distribution of computers (MacBook, iBook), music players (iPod, iPod Touch),
mobile phones (iPhones 1–5), and tablet computers (iPads) employs a standard outsourcing model similar to  most consumer
electronics manufacturers. By contrast, its content supply chain, the procurement and delivery of music, movies, and apps,
ties consumers to Apple devices. This integration allows Apple to control how content is  used and transferred, ensures inter-
operability and imposes high switching costs. Non-Apple devices do not tie the content to  the device, allowing consumers
to own their content and switch devices without additional costs. By producing the device and designing the software that
connects it with all other platforms, Apple is  able to control the digital marketplace and by extension the consumer.
Typically,  consumers of Apple products are analyzed in terms of their brand loyalty and the power that bestows on
Apple; by contrast, we  isolate Apple’s ability to control its consumers as a  distinguishing factor of its business model. For
example, Mun˜iz and O’Guinn (2001) characterized the fierce loyalty of Macintosh computer owners as “a  specialized, non-
geographically bound community, based on a structured set of social relationships among admirers of a brand” (p. 412).
Schouten and McAlexander (Schouten & McAlexander, 1995) called such groups ‘subcultures of consumption’ that share a
commitment to a  particular product class, brand, or consumption activity. Characteristics of a subculture of consumption
include,  “an identifiable, hierarchical social structure [based on status]; a unique ethos; . . . and unique jargon, rituals, and
modes of symbolic expression to facilitate shared meanings in  consumer goods and activities” (Schouten &  McAlexander,
1995)  (p. 43). Boorstin (1973) called such groups ‘consumption communities,’ a more encompassing term than subcultures.
He argued that in consumption communities, Americans’ sense of unity and commonality is  increasingly based on common
consumption patterns rather than daily interaction (for additional information, see: Belk and Tumbat (2005)). Yet, having a
loyal consumer base did not necessarily help Apple expand and grow (see AAPL share price pre-2003). Instead, it was Apple’s
ability to ‘own the consumer’ that allowed it to translate its dedicated consumer base into meaningful revenue streams.
3.1. Physical supply chain
In  contrast to the usual emphasis on Apple’s innovative business model practices, we  begin with the more mundane
element:  the physical supply chain. In this respect, Apple operates similarly to  most consumer electronics companies but
combines a luxury brand pricing and marketing strategy. Apple seeks end-to-end control of its physical supply chain to  min-
imize costs from sourcing to store. The configuration of the physical supply chain is  unremarkable relative to its competitors;
for instance, several of Apple’s contract manufacturers also assemble an estimated 40 percent of the world’s consumer elec-
tronics for customers such as Dell, Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, Nintendo, Nokia, Samsung and Sony (Duhigg &  Bradsher,
2012). As is the case for the majority of consumer electronics companies, Apple’s manufacturing and assembly is  done in
South East Asia, mainly China, and shipped half way  around the world to European and American distribution centers,
where the stock is stored until ordered by  retailers. Supplier relations are based on strict control of product information,
instant  responses to new parts or  product failures and a mandated two weeks of parts inventory within a  mile of assembly
plants in China. This policy allows Apple to handle massive product launches without having to  maintain large and costly
inventories (Satariano &  Burrows, 2012). Apple exercises its power by having a  contingency plan where a product can be
slightly tweaked or a  new component used, meaning that within 18 months even a key supplier can be  replaced (Jacobides,
Knudsen, & Augier, 2006). Moreover, Apple places electronic monitors (RFID) in some boxes to  allow observers in  the U.S. to
track them through Chinese factories. These tactics exert downward pressure on prices, leading to lower profits and margins
for its suppliers; for example, Apple only allows its suppliers a few weeks to  manufacture hundreds of thousands of devices
in advance of a  new product launch (Satariano & Burrows, 2012).
Apple  combines the low-cost manufacture and assembly model of many electronics companies with a luxury brand
marketing and pricing strategy. This might be  unique among most large consumer electronics companies, but it is widely
used in the clothing and footwear industry. The Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessey group (LVMH) manufactures the majority of
its goods in low-cost locations and subsequently ships them to  large department and boutique stores in developed markets.
The advent of the luxury brand no longer is  an exclusive claim to  craftsmanship or manufacturing quality. Instead, luxury
brands, such as Apple and Louis Vuitton, are  designed to showcase the brand lifestyle, establish the brand image, and present
the product in a  stylized shopping environment that makes consumers feel more comfortable paying luxury prices (Barker,
1997).
In many respects, this efficiency-based supply chain strategy is a  woefully out-dated aspect of Apple’s business model.
In the 1980s, outsourcing manufacturing and assembly to  the developing world to exploit low labor and material costs was
seen as the primary way to  gain efficiencies in the supply chain. These assumptions fomented during the long period of global
economic stability with low commodity prices (oil and food) and comparatively inexpensive labor as the norm. However,
Christopher and Holweg (2011) created a  volatility index to show that 2008 was  as a  turning point where the world left an
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almost 30-year period of relative stability and entered an era of global turbulence where several indicators such as oil  prices,
stock market bubbles, political instability and terrorism, were all elevated in  tandem. They argue that the “conventional
wisdom”  in supply chain management needs radical re-thinking and call for a  move to  flexible supply chain solutions. It
can be argued then that to  adapt to commodity price fluctuations, environmental changes and geo-political issues, business
models need to embrace the concept of end-to-end supply chain flexibility, not simply a  reliance on  flexible suppliers, as is
the case with Apple. This means manufacturing and assembly now need to be  closer to  the end consumer to reduce the risks
that come with each additional link in the chain (Christopher, Peck, & Towill, 2006; Gattorna, 2006). For example, it might
make sense for companies, such as Apple, to  have key suppliers in  each main market, to  ensure that spikes in transportation
costs or damage to infrastructure from natural disasters can be offset.
Even more important to the Apple business model is the degree to which its supply chain management strategy directly
undermines its marketing platform and brand image. In the 1980s and 90s, Apple prided itself on ‘American production for
American consumers,’ and until 2002 some of Apple’s manufacturing was  still based at the iMac plant in Elk Grove, California.
Since 2003, Apple moved its entire manufacturing base overseas, as did most other major electronics manufacturers. Apple
holds steadfast to principles of end-to-end control, low cost sourcing strategies and an ability to tap only one source of
flexibility: its suppliers. It is clear that Apple’s motivation to manufacture in China is not simply low labor costs, as China has
experienced average annual wage  increases of between 9 and 35 percent (Gartner, 2012). In their New York Times article,
Duhigg and Bradsher (2012) quote an Apple Executive explaining the advantage of producing in  China. The executive cites
the example of Steve Jobs’ insistence on fitting iPhones with scratch-resistant glass screens just weeks before launch:
New screens began arriving at the plant near midnight. A foreman immediately roused 8,000 workers inside the
company’s dormitories and each employee was  given a  biscuit and a  cup of tea, guided to a  workstation and within
half an hour started a 12-hour shift fitting glass screens into beveled frames. Within 96 hours, the plant was  producing
over  10,000 iPhones a  day (p. 1).
This example makes clear that Apple’s business model relies more on strict control over workers than low labor costs.
Worker control includes restrictions on their movements and leisure time, monetary penalties for missing productivity
targets, and the frequently delayed or failed payment of wages rife within the Chinese manufacturing and assembly sector
(Chan, 2001; Lee & Gender, 1998; Pun, 2005). Of course, this system is underwritten by the Chinese state through the
fixed-resident system and the dormitory labor regime (Bernard, 2000; Cantin & Taylor, 2008; Tao, 2006).
Openly  endorsing these practices puts Apple squarely in the cross-hairs of labor and human rights groups; this directly
undermines its consumer brand intended to appeal to  the hip,  and increasingly socially conscious, consumer. Apple’s refusal
to heed complaints over its labor practices is  a major mistake if they consider how successful the anti-sweatshop campaign
was at damaging the Nike and The Gap brands (Harrison & Scorse, 2006; Spar & La Mure, 2003). The contemporary consci-
entious consumer expresses his or her ideas about everything from local affairs to foreign relations at the point of purchase
(Simon, 2011). By ignoring the growing discontent over their labor practices, Apple is dismissing the important relationship
between reputation and brand (Ettenson & Knowles, 2008).
3.2.  Content supply-chain
The  key to Apple’s content supply chain is  controlling how content is used and transferred. Content is crucial because it
inscribes profitability to hardware devices and creates an Apple ecosystem that, together, imposes high costs on consumers
attempting to leave. The first element of the content supply chain is  the in-house production of the operating system and
software for Apple products. For example, by  2005 OS X based products (the operating system that runs exclusively on Mac
computers) accounted for nearly half of Apple’s profits. By 2010, OS X products made up 22 percent of total margin, whereas
Apple’s new iOS (iPhone Operating System) was responsible for approximately 70 percent of Apple’s gross profits, and by
2010, 92 percent of Apple’s profits were generated from platform-based products (Dediu, 2012). The iPod/iTunes platform
simply perfected the integrated multi-channel platform by incorporating revenue streams from media content. This was
initially accomplished through strict licensing agreements with major record labels such as EMI, Sony and Universal to secure
access to thousands of titles. Apple maintained control over key elements of the iPod, particularly the user interface and
the interfaces between the iPod, iTunes software, and the online iTunes Music Store (iTMS). The highly specialized iTunes
client software was developed internally to inhibit connectivity with other software platforms while also reducing costs on
licensing or royalty fees (Dedrick et al., 2009).
Moreover, Apple restricted how content was downloaded from the iTMS by using their “Fairplay” digital rights manage-
ment system (which is managed as a  company trade secret) and made this music only playable on the iPod. This architecture
of control is executed from ‘top to bottom,’ with proprietary systems for selling, playing and protecting music. Apple defends
its integrated platform using extreme secrecy, refusing to  open up the digital rights management system to others, and its
corporate knowledge regarding the product design and user interfaces. By 2009, Apple had captured approximately 70
percent of the global market for legitimate digital music downloads (Reder, 2009). The integration between content and
hardware provides customers not  only with a  seamless user experience, from purchase to use, but also ensures that Apple
captures the largest share of profits compared to the suppliers of the actual content (Dedrick et al., 2009).
This  practice was replicated with the advent of the App store. App developers license the use of their product to Apple
that, in turn, provides the platform to distribute the content. To generate external digital content, Apple opened up their
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platform to third-party developers in March 2008 with the release of the iPhone Software Development Kit  (SDK). This
enabled developers to  create applications, initially for the iPhone, and then later for the iPod touch and iPad. SDK allowed
Apple’s culture of tight control to be extended to Apps because it determined precisely which type of functionality could be
made available. For example, applications could not compete against existing platforms, such as Adobe, the most common
technology for handling video on Internet (Howcroft, this issue). In  September 2010, Apple bolstered their control with
the release of 113 review guidelines covering technical information, privacy, religion, sex and trademarks to restrict which
applications would be made available for general release at the App Store (Build innovative native apps, 2012). The App Store
gives developers a direct link to  users and allows them to retain 70 percent of sales and in-app advertising revenue. Apple
benefits from not having to pay the labor costs of developers and loses nothing if an app does not sell but profits handsomely if
successful. This particular form of outsourcing has been termed ‘crowdsourcing’ (Brabham, 2008), which has been described
by Business Week (Crowdsourcing, 2006) as a  novel way  of ‘milking the masses for inspiration’. Crowdsourcing can be seen
as an extension of the supplier outsourcing model used by  Apple in  that rather than simply sourcing expertise from low-cost
locations, Apple can outsource jobs  to ‘the  new pool of cheap labor: everyday people’ (Howe, 2012) (p. 1). The process draws
upon the abilities and competences of the many, as opposed to a specialized few, expanding the boundaries of the firm to
harness expertise on an unprecedented scale (Tiwana, 2012) (for more on crowdsourcing, see Howcroft, this issue).
The advent of the iPad is  pivotal to  expanding Apple’s content-driven business. It was designed to make the user primarily
a consumer of content, unlike laptops that  allow users to  also be producers of content. Moreover, from its inception the iPad
was designed with potential revenue streams in  mind. It has been successful in fundamentally changing the market for online
content providers by creating a greater role for online advertising and requiring users to pay for content they were previously
enjoying for free (Guarino, 2010). This is precisely why  the media industry called the iPad the ‘Jesus tablet’ because it allowed
the industry to  start generating revenue from online content and was seen as the savior of the media business model. USA
Today and The New York Times were the first to offer paid subscriptions via the iPad, and large publishing houses such as
HarperCollins, Macmillan and Penguin offered titles under the iBooks application. Online content providers have found it
challenging to produce sufficient revenue, but tablet computing is  seen as essential to providing the necessary platform to
generate future revenue from online content (Li &  Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2010). Apple’s next large project is television, which
will have a built-in digital video recorder, connect to  the App and iTunes music stores and allow users to  store their digital
purchases in the iCloud (Flamm,  2011).
Apple’s content supply chain is a  central pillar of its integrated multi-platform ecosystem, and a  key element of its novel
business model. Nevertheless, the ability of this business model to  continue to  succeed and deliver value is by no means
certain. Now Apple must not only compete with new and existing electronics companies but also with itself. Over time,
we have seen that each new Apple product launch, although propelled by innovation, has a  significant downside in that it
cannibalizes Apple’s own product lines. For example, iPhone sales came at the expense of the iPod because most consumers
would not purchase a  separate music player when it is  built into a  mobile phone, in the same way  that laptop sales came
at the expense of desktops. According to  Taylor (Taylor, 2011), it seems likely that the iPad will create further redundancies
in  Apple hardware lines, as customers are more likely to forgo buying another laptop if they simply require a device for
e-mail, web browsing, using apps  and listening to  music. Further, consumers would be unlikely to pay subscription fees for
both the iPad and iPhone, as the iPad can perform all of the same functions, arguably better, except for receiving calls and
texts, functions that are far less expensive with a  regular mobile phone. Because content is  available on multiple hardware
devices, the multi-platform actually facilitates greater redundancies in  the hardware lines. Therefore, not only does Apple
need to continue to launch the next innovative device, it needs to compensate for its own  destruction of existing hardware
sales.
Moreover, Apple faces new challenges from competing hardware-content ecosystems. Android has already emerged as
its main rival ecosystem. Samsung has its line of Galaxy smartphones and tablets, Google is producing the Nexus 7 tablet
and Nexus Q home-entertainment player and Microsoft is launching its Surface tablets. Thus far, Apple’s only response
has been to launch a  series of legal battles, in  particular against Samsung, which is costly and unlikely to  stem the tide of
competition. Google and Microsoft have tailored their devices to fit their existing business models. Google will compete on
price and sell its tablet for $199 (compared to Apple’s $399 for the base model tablet) with the aim  of generating revenue
from web-based content and advertising. Microsoft’s Surface will retail at a  higher price but will have the advantage of the
Windows 8 software platform that will mean higher margins per device sold and allow for greater integration with other
computing devices.
The  limits to  growth in  the Apple business model are most evident in the challenges it faces in emerging markets. Most
consumer electronics products were able to  successfully expand into emerging economies only by creating low-price models,
initially with televisions but more recently mobile phones and laptops. Apple is still unwilling to develop less expensive
models or lower price points, as a  means of preserving its luxury brand image. This is  most clearly illustrated in the world’s
largest smartphone market: China. Apple’s has the smallest share of China’s smartphone market compared to  Android or
Symbian (Nokia’s platform) simply because these platforms can run  on much less expensive handsets. Instead of lowering
hardware prices, Apple is attempting to generate sales by securing an agreement with China Telecom to introduce a  cross-
subsidized tariff scheme, similar to those in  Europe and America. In this scheme, customers sign contracts for 18–24 months,
which helps to conceal hardware payments in the subscription fees. Whether Chinese consumers will move away from the
familiar prepaid model simply to attain an iPhone remains to be seen, but several American brands have  learned the hard
way that one cannot simply transpose a  brand from one culture to another.
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3.3. Retailing Apple
Another  important element of the Apple business model is the control it exercises over the retail landscape. Apple’s recent
ascent to the top of the electronics market has disrupted the traditional supplier–retailer relationship because it is both a
major supplier to the big box stores and competitor through its Apple branded outlets. Apple is  considered a prize for any
retailer because of intense customer demand, high price points and content, which creates a need for high margin hardware
and accessories. However, with these rewards comes Apple’s desire for strict control over display and prices, requests large
retailers would not typically acquiesce to  from a  single supplier. Moreover, Apple is also a  direct rival to major retailers
because it operates a  chain of Apple branded stores and offers online content that retailers had traditionally sold in hard
copy format.
Consumer electronics giants such as Best Buy, Circuit City and Radio Shack in  North America or Dixons (owner of PC
world and Curry’s) in Europe have the highest volume turnover and remain central to the distribution of electronic goods,
even in the face of online retailers. Most consumers still go to  a  store to  make major electronics purchases, a  key reason that
Dell Computers is  expanding out of its traditional online format to seek some retail presence. Most large electronics retailers
are now multichannel firms, where the same customer visits the retailer via different channels for different purposes e.g.,
obtains product information and reviews online, makes purchases in-store and contacts customer support via telephone
(Sorescu et al., 2011). This one-stop-shop model has allowed the large electronics retailers to  exercise considerable power
over suppliers.
Apple’s relationship with big box stores is unlike that of most suppliers, as it retains strict control over display and
prices. For instance, large national retailers are required to have an ‘Apple Valley’ in their stores, an area exclusively ded-
icated to Apple products. Typically, most retailers will organize their floor space by product type but, when dealing with
Apple, retailers give this brand exclusive space to  present their entire product range collectively. This developed out of
Apple’s tumultuous relationship with US electronics giant Best Buy. Since the introduction of the Macintosh computer in
the 1990s, Best Buy and Apple have had substantial disagreements, including Apple voicing concerns that product was
not presented in  the most favorable manner by staff who did not have sufficient product knowledge to sell it effectively
(Bangeman, 2005). In 2000, Steve Jobs, former Apple CEO, said: “I started to get scared; the company was  increasingly
dependent  on mega-retailers, companies that had little incentive, never mind training, to position Apple’s products as
anything unique, we had to do something” (Useem, 2012). Apple will often supply its own employees to staff busy retail
outlets and promote Apple products in ‘the  valley’ to ensure that their products stand out in the box store retail environ-
ment.
Apple’s control over the retail environment seems to  have tempered the long-standing power large electronic retailers
have enjoyed over suppliers in the past. This is largely because of the loyal and lucrative Apple consumer base that makes
purchases at premium price-points in  the high margin categories of hardware and accessories. The travel search engine
Orbitz uses software to detect whether customers are using an Apple device and then offer more expensive holiday packages
because their research shows that Apple consumers will pay more for comparable products (The Economist, 2012). Access to
these consumers is  essential for large electronics retailers because they are  increasingly loosing revenue to price-sensitive
consumers  through the show-rooming effect, where customers browse in-store only to buy online at a  lower price. Apple
maintains consistent price points for all of its products because it does not offer discounting schemes as most electronics
manufacturers do. This means that online and in-store prices remain homogeneous, protecting large retailers’ revenues
streams by neutralizing online competition. This is particularly lucrative in the accessories category, as Apple specifically
designs its products to prevent universal adaptability, which means that  retailers command high margins of between 55
and 70 percent on most accessories.
While hardware and accessories remain the profitable mainstay of the retailer, Apple has eliminated huge segments of
the box stores’ revenue stream by moving all of its software and content online. Apple’s online marketplace accelerated
the decline of software, DVD and CD sales in  retail stores by making content and applications easily available online at a
lower price. These retailers had been able to  expect 30–35 percent margins on CD and DVDs, but these are now largely
low-margin clearance items. Retailers have had no response to  the ease of downloading and lower price points offered to
the customer. Apple’s continued drive for content is  again likely to put it at loggerheads with big box stores. For example,
Apple has developed iPad versions of popular video games, which will directly rival other handheld gaming devices such as
the Nintendo DS and Sony PSP (Hanai, 2010). This will cut into another large segment of the retailers’ business because Apple
plans to make video games downloadable directly from the Apple store. Competition from new electronics companies offers
some reprieve for large retailers because more devices on the market means that retailers can regain some of the power lost
when Apple was the only product in  that space.
Further, Apple’s retail stores are direct competitors to  big-box electronics outlets. This can be a delicate balancing act
because Apple needs both large retailers and its own branded stores to maintain sales volumes. The fact that Apple has its
own chain of branded retail stores puts it in  a  unique position because if the retailer does not cooperate, Apple can sell a
product in their own branded stores. Apple is seen as a  leader in  the ‘branded retail’ environment in which flagship stores
are used to enhance brand image (Ilonen, Wren, Gabrielsson, & Salimaki, 2011). Apple stores have managed to reverse a
long-standing trend where an increase in store size led to a  rise in  sales revenue (Sampson, 2008). By 1996, big-box retailers
such as Best Buy, Circuit City and Nobody Beats the Wiz  were the top volume leaders, with larger stores averaging between
30,000 and 45,000 square feet; in  2004, chains with smaller square footage, such as Apple, were listed among the top volume
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leaders marking a full circle swing back to reduced store sizes (Sampson, 2008). A clear outcome of the success of Apple’s
retail environment is a higher rate of sales per square foot than any other retailer (Sorescu et al., 2011). In 2007, Apple’s retail
stores generated annual sales of $4032 per square foot  while Best Buy averaged $930.00, the highest of any other electronics
retailer (Useem, 2012).
Apple’s  own-retail environment exemplifies its multi-platform advantage: it creates a  space that facilitates inter-linkages
between computers, phones, music players and tablets with video, photography, music, software and apps. The first Apple
store opened in 2001, which coincided with the launch of the iPod. This allowed a  co-specialization of the two assets, as
the iPod needed effective sales efforts and attractive displays and the Apple Store needed a hot product to drive traffic to
succeed (Dedrick et al., 2009). Since then, Apple stores have sought to  ‘leverage complementaries’ by tying-in services and
product knowledge. Customers can receive one-on-one tutorials, participate in workshops and have products repaired at
the ‘Genius Bar’. These tie-ins increase the customer value proposition because satisfaction will be increased if a customer
can fully operate his or her new purchase (Sorescu et al., 2011). By acting as both a major supplier to the big box retailers
and  a primary competitor through its branded stores, Apple is able to dominate the retail landscape and effectively own  the
consumer.
Nevertheless, introducing small branded retail stores to compete with big box retailers is  not novel, and Apple is  not
highly innovative in its use of retail stores as part of its business model. For  example, Roscoe and Baker (in press) outline
how sporting goods brands such as adidas have developed a  well-defined segmentation strategy that  divides retailers into
specific groups and only allows them to  purchase particular ranges of products. For  example, box stores that adopt a “stack
them high, sell them cheap” business model only have access to low to mid-range adidas products, while adidas’ own
retail stores, located in  premium locations such as Oxford Street in London, have access to premium range merchandize.
This  segmentation strategy allows adidas to control price points across the UK market, but more importantly allows it to
maintain brand image by showcasing the best ranges in  adidas branded stores (Roscoe & Baker, in press). By contrast, Apple
stores offer the same ranges and prices in  their branded stores as in  big box retailers. Again, this highlights that the retail
component of Apple’s business model is more closely comparable to luxury consumer brands, such as Louis Vuitton or  Coach,
which sell premium priced merchandize at large high-end department stores and small boutique stores without product or
price differentiation.
4.  Conclusion
This paper used a  business model framework to analyze what made Apple so successful after 2003, as well as present a
detailed examination of its main limitations. This case study sought to advance a  more holistic account of Apple’s business
model as a way  of offering a  detailed evaluation of its strengths and weaknesses. Specifically, the case study considers how
the Apple business model allows it to ‘own the consumer’ through its multi-channel platform that relies on the integration
of content (software, media, and apps) and hardware (laptop, phones, and tablets) to drive growth. Apple’s business model
enables it to exercise unparalleled control over it end-to-end supply chain. Its physical supply chain relies heavily on supplier
flexibility to overcome the inherent limitations of having manufacturing and assembly facilities so far from the primary
consumer markets. Moreover, Apple’s association with unsafe and inhumane labor practices in China has led to  a  growing
assault against its brand image, a  trend that has caused substantial damage to  major market leaders in the past. In addition,
the content supply chain has been easily replicated by competitors and, as such, facilitated the creation of rival multi-
channel platforms. Apple’s position is further complicated because it not only faces competition from rival ecosystems
but  also from itself because with each new product launch previous devices become redundant. Finally, we see that Apple’s
rather unsophisticated retailing strategy of forcing big box retailers to  compete against its own retail stores places important
constraints on its ability to  grow.
The study of business models in the literature is still at a relatively embryonic stage; the concept only appeared prior to
the dot-com bubble in 2001, and there are still many fruitful avenues for future research. For  example, a business model
framework could be applied to evaluate Apple’s entry into new markets to provide a lens on how business models must
be adapted to new countries and cultures. In the same way, this framework could be used to contrast Apple with its major
competitors, such as Samsung, to  provide a more robust understanding of competition in the consumer electronics industry.
Another avenue for research would be a more in-depth evaluation of the consumer in Apple’s business model and how, or
if, Apple plans to  innovate their model to meet changing consumer attitudes regarding social responsibility. Finally, more
detailed research into Apple has the potential to  allow us to  understand how  market leaders are created and, inevitably,
decline.
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